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The new law was eventually passed in late January of this year without the census provision, but it appears that Kabila has yet another card to play.
On March 2, he set a 120-day deadline for the implementation of découpage, a constitutional change introduced in 2006 intended to divide Congo’s 11 provinces into 26. The 2006 constitutional change was a milestone in the country’s transition from almost a decade of civil war and was meant to transform Congo into a fully fledged democracy. However, while Kinshasa should have completed découpage by 2010 in accordance with the constitution, the process has not yet even begun. The delay is not surprising given that découpage is one of the most complex processes that the government has had to grapple with since the official end of the war. As a result, it neither budgeted nor designed an execution plan for découpage.
In pursuing découpage now, Kabila can ostensibly hold on to power. In the last few months, a number of his former supporters, such as the political party Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans, defected from the ruling majority. In December 2014, one of his allies, Moïse Katumbi—the powerful governor of Katanga Province and representative of the ruling party in Katanga—publicly opposed Kabila’s quest to extend the presidential term limits and run for a third term. The speech sent shock waves across the business and political scene; although Katumbi was widely believed to harbor his own presidential aspirations, his ties to Kabila were generally seen as essential to his potential ascension
If implemented, découpage could allow Kabila to marginalize such power brokers and defectors. Katumbi and many others would be replaced once their provinces were dissolved and reconfigured into smaller ones.
At the same time, if logistic, financial, and political reasons prevent the successful implementation of découpage (and that is quite likely), the process may not only help delay the electoral process but also serve as a convenient justification for Kabila to amend the constitution. After all, if the constitution’s call for découpage is no longer practical, Kabila might argue that other conditions—such as the two-term limit—also require amending.
The prospect of dissecting Katanga has heightened ethnic tensions, with some groups in the south of the province such as the Lunda viewing découpage as a means to increase regional influence and others, such as the Balubakat—Kabila’s own ethnic group—seeing it as a recipe for marginalization. In an effort to discourage the government from implementing découpage, some members of the Balubakat have thrown their support behind a regional militia, prompting a major humanitarian crisis in the so-called Triangle of Death in north-central Katanga.
Other provinces—such as Équateur and Orientale—would also be likely to experience growing competition over resources, power, and representation if découpage was implemented. This could spark localized conflicts with largely unpredictable consequences.
There are many other, less visible pitfalls from découpage as well, particularly for the private sector. For example, découpage might well lead to more bureaucracy and corruption. As new decision-making structures are created at what are now district levels, companies are likely to encounter additional delays and unexpected costs in their operations. The central government and provincial authorities already ask companies to follow contradictory and ambiguous regulations and taxes, a problem that découpage is also likely to exacerbate. Meanwhile, the advent of new local authorities is likely to expose companies to increased extortion and demands for bribes.
